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INTRODUCTION 
In one of the more surprising developments since the Latin American debt 
crisis began in 1982, Mexico in the summer of 1987 found itself with the 
unlikely dilemma of how to spend nearly $16 billion of foreign reserves. 1 A 
number of circumstances contributed to the turnaround: 
1. Oil prices stabilized in late 1986, then rose with the increase in uncertainty 
concerning Persian Gulf shipping. 
2. Following an earlier delay, the country received a $12 billion disbursement of a 
credit package agreed with the International Monetary Fund. 
3. With successive peso devaluations resulting in an undervalued peso, non-oil ex-
ports rose at an annual rate of 30 percent. 
4. Improved economic conditions and the undervalued peso resulted in a significant 
inflow of Mexican assets previously held abroad. 
Several options appear to be open to the government, each having its pros 
and cons. Increased domestic spending to stimulate growth and create jobs 
would make inflation worse: price rises could easily reach an annual rate of 200 
percent within months, with serious implications for wages, foreign exchange, 
and interest rates. Yet politically in an election year to idly sit on $16 billion, par-
ticularly when interest is being paid on a substantial part of that sum, seems 
unacceptable. Quite a different approach would be to use the reserves to buy 
Mexican sovereign paper on the secondary market, thus cancelling part of the 
country's $110 billion foreign debt. Given that most Mexican securities in the 
summer of 1987 were selling at about 55 to 60 percent of face value, Mexico 
could reduce its external debt burden by $13 to $18 billion by allocating between 
$8 billion and $10 billion to this purpose. This .would save the country $800 
million to $1 billion per year in interest payments. Unfortunately, despite 
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its technical merits and pressure of its favor coming from the country's 
creditors, the debt purchase scheme seems politically infeasible without 
some sort of compensating arrangement with the country's creditors. 
Analysts stressing this fact note that a nation that has gone through five 
years of practically no economic growth, a drop of nearly 40 percent in the 
purchasing power of most salaries, and a virtual suspension of job creation 
will not readily accept that the best way to spend hard-earned foreign funds 
is to give them back to the banks. The government cannot publicly 
acknowledge that in 1986 the economy could not grow because of the lack 
of money and that in 1987 it cannot grow because of too much money. Nor 
can a country already suffering from double digit inflation be told that 
growth must be postponed since it would rekindle inflation. 2 
Castaneda has concluded that 
Mexico's current predicament is more a symptom of the continued protraction of its 
economy than a sign of its recovery. The debt crisis has not been solved; it has just 
been postponed, together with economic growth. If anything, foreign reserves are up 
precisely because growth has been forsaken. Under these circumstances, the wisest 
course may be then one which President de la Madrid will, it is to be hoped, settle 
on. It would involve using the reserves partially to prime the economy, achieving 
some growth and modest job creation at the cost of a moderate increase in inflation, 
but saving the bulk for de la Madrid's successor. 
Clearly whether or not the reserves are spent by the de la Madrid ad-
ministration, the new president of Mexico, Salinas de Gortari3 will be 
forced to tackle the fundamental problem that has confounded recent ad-
ministrations: how to make the Mexican economy grow at levels compatible 
with demographic growth and social welfare. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relative merits of 
Castaneda's suggestion that saving the nation's earnings for the Salinas de 
Gortari administration could be de la Madrid's ultimate tribute to what may 
well prove to be his most redeeming virtue: le sens de /'etat, as opposed to 
the portfolio manager's despair in the face of idle assets. Hopefully in the 
process of examining this issue some conclusions can be drawn as to the role 
of external debt in Mexico's recent economic performance, and guidelines 
established as to the country's best medium-term strategy for dealing with 
its external obligations. 
PHASES OF MEXICAN DEVELOPMENT 
Any discussion of Mexico's current debt problems would be incomplete 
without some reference to the development strategies that lead to the current 
situation. Many observers• trace the current debt crisis back to the Echeverria 
f\dministration (1971-1976). Echeverria sought to address many of the 
· distributional problems associated with the country's attempts at import 
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substitution industrialization with a modification of this basic strategy dubbed 
"Shared Development." It had four pillars:5 
1. the use of public expenditure to stimulate demand and broaden the domestic 
market; 
2. the fuller use of existing productive capacity; 
3. the deepening of import substitution; and 
4. the expansion and diversification of exports to help confront the foreign ex-
change bottleneck. 
These moves represented an effort to revitalize a strategy of insulation and 
to introduce a different domestic distribution of gains and losses. 6 
In retrospect it is clear that there were a number of basic dilemmas in 
Mexican economic policy under Echeverria. These included the desire to use 
fiscal policy to reform the social structure, but then doing so without 
creating an adequate tax base; the desire to raise exports, but seeking to do 
so while maintaining a fixed exchange rate in the face of accelerating infla-
tion; the desire to strengthen public sector enterprises while trying to main-
tain their prices at unrealistically low levels; and striving for greater in-
dustrial efficiency under a policy of protectionism. 7 The net result was that 
the public sector deficit expanded from an average annual rate of 2.5 per-
cent of GDP in 1965-1970 to 9.5 percent in 1976 and an increase in the ex-
ternal debt; by 1976 Mexico's public foreign debt was $20 billion. These 
alternative means of supporting "Shared Development" proved unsus-
tainable, however, and in 1976 the development strategy collapsed in the 
midst of domestic political and foreign debt crisis.• 
Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) began his administration with an IMF 
stabilization program, and a promise of structural change. Once the 
petroleum revenues began coming in, however, attempts at stabilization 
were abandoned as Lopez Portillo decided to spend his way out of trouble 
through adopting a massively expensive development program. 9 As the oil 
revenues increased foreign borrowing also accelerated; control over spend-
ing became increasingly lax as the government undertook a major expan-
sion in infrastructure investment. 10 Instead of cutting back expenditures in 
the wake of the 1981 decline in oil revenues (reaching only $14.5 billion in-
stead of the $20 billion projected in the 1981 budget), the government con-
tinued its spending by even heavier foreign borrowing, mainly short term. 
By the end of 1981 the public sector foreign debt, scheduled to rise during 
the 12 months from $34 billion to $40 billion, actually jumped to $53 billion 
of which $14.5 was due for repayment in 1982. 11 
Progress in Dealing with the Debt • 
. When President De La Madrid took office on December 1, 1982, the 
country was facing a dual economic crisis, domestic in origin, and external 
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conditions were intensifying the problems. The first crisis, which could be 
considered cyclical, required frank and immediate attention, while the sec-
ond, more structural in nature, would take years of constant effort to over-
come. 
Consequently, the economic and social strategy incorporated into the 
1983-1988 National Development Plan centered on two interrelated lines of 
action: one of immediate, short-term economic measures and the other of 
structural change. Both involved reducing the public deficit, increasing 
domestic savings, and reducing trade barriers, while, at the same time, pro-
tecting productive capacity and employment, and bringing down inflation. 
In an inflationary context, interest payments on debt contain a sizeable 
component corresponding to the inflationary depreciation of that same 
debt. If this factor is applied to Mexico, it is evident that during the 
1983-1985 period there was significant progress in lowering the relative 
value of the public debt: 12 
1. The domestic public debt, after having increased 60 percent in real terms during 
1982, fell 30 percent between 1983 and 1985. 
2. Also during this period, foreign public debt, in relation to the gross domestic pro-
duct, fell from 43.9 to 40.6 percent. This reflects a decline in the growth rate of 
net borrowing, which fell from levels surpassing 7 percent of the GDP in 1981 to 
3.1 percent in 1983, 1.5 percent in 1984, and 0.4 percent in 1985. 
3. In the 19 months prior to July 1986, the country received no net financial 
resources from the rest of the world. 
The country has also made important improvements in public finances, in 
trimming the size of government, and in increasing efficiency in public 
enterprises. 13 Between 1983 and 1985 the total public sector deficit 
decreased from 18 percent of the GDP to 9.2 percent. 
4. A better way of evaluating the adjustment is in the primary deficit (total deficit 
minus interest payments on the debt). In 1981, the primary deficit amounted to 
8.1 percent of the GDP in 1986; despite the fall in oil prices it was anticipated that 
there would be a surplus of 3.9 percent. 
5. The largest part of the reduction in the fiscal deficit came from cuts in govern-
ment spending on goods and services before interest payments; spending has 
declined almost eight percentage points of GDP since 1981. 
6. The system of state subsidies was also completely revised. Between 1982 and 1985, 
government transfers to public companies-excluding support f<?.r debt ser-
vice-declined three percentage points of GDP. In real terms this means that 
transfers declined by 40 percent between 1982 and 1985. 
7. Finally, an effort has been made to reduce the gap between the general price levels 
for consumer goods and the prices of public goods and services, especially in 
energy. This has reduced implicit subsidies and eliminated distortions in relative 
prices. 
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To stop capital flight, the government has set interest rates well above the 
inflation rate. In addition, the government, beginning in the summer of 
1986, introduced a new type of government savings instrument whose value 
in Mexican pesos is tied to the value of the dollar. In other words, Mexicans 
are now able to invest their money within the country assured that the 
money will grow as if it were held in dollars in a U.S. bank account. 14 The 
authorities have also created incentives for export-oriented companies and 
companies generating new jobs. Government subsidies on gas, electricity, 
mass transportation, and basic foods are being phased out. They are also 
divesting themselves of many state run firms. 
On another front the government has enjoyed some success in its debt-
capitalization program. 15 Launched in June 1986, this program allows debt to 
be converted into capital by foreign investors. Conversion is authorized if the 
applicant can persuade the government that it will create new jobs, increase ex-
ports, or introduce advanced technology. Depending on the nature of the proj-
ect, the debt is exchanged for pesos at 76-100 percent of face value (unlike the 
Chilean regime, introduced a year earlier, which exchanges at par). 16 By late 
1986 some $200 million in external debt had been converted under this system 
and the government had more than 70 applications pending. 
A parallel scheme was suggested to the Mexican government by the Inter-
national Finance Corporation (IFC): a closed-end fund which would buy up 
foreign loans, and convert them into peso-denominated direct investments 
in Mexican companies. The IFC itself would be the direct investor, though 
it would make a secondary offering of its own shares to private investment. 
aearly, this indirect procedure only slightly obscures the fact that in opting 
for debt-equity swaps Mexico has had to overlook many of its selective 
restrictions on foreign investment, another traditional banner of the coun-
try's nationalism. 17 
Most importantly the country's debt-for-equity swap plan not only rids the 
state of costly firms, but adds needed dollars to the treasury and is a strong 
stimulus in luring direct foreign investment. Debt-for-equity agreements 
amounted to $850 million in foreign investment in the last nine months of 
1986. Primarily because of fears of inflation, the program ceiling for 1987 
was set at $1.5 billion. 11 While optimists contend that this program could 
liquidate 8 percent of Mexico's external debt, and that the country could get 
rid of a major source of federal budgetary deficits 19 by offering discounts of 5 
to 25 percent to foreign investors wishing to purchase shares in 55 state-run 
firms currently facing indebtedness and liquidity problems, it is not at all 
clear that the program will make more than a token dent in the country's ex-
ternal debt. 20 At most, foreign bankers and Finance Ministry officials 
estimate debt swaps will retire about $3 or $4 billion of Mexican debt. Of-
ficials characterize the debt-for-equity scheme as a temporary measure that 
may become more restrictive and eventually be eliminated entirely.21 
While demand for Mexican equity remained strong through most of 1987, 
the Mexican government seems unlikely to raise its self-imposed ceiling on 
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the supply of such swaps. In part the main reservations Mexican authorities 
have with the program (in addition to purely nationalistic concerns) involve 
the fact that 
1. The country may be simply foregoing foreign exchange, since most swap invest-
ment would have arrived anyway in real dollars. This is most likely the case in the 
automotive industry but less clear in tourism, and in the maquiladoras, which 
have become the new foci of debt-swapping. 
2. The cheap investment pesos may fuel a surge in inflation. 22 
3. Debt swaps give multinational subsidiaries with preexisting expansion plans a 
steep discount in a local currency that is already substantially undervalued. There 
is no evidence, moreover, officials acknowledge, that the program is attracting in-
vestors not already established in Mexico. 23 
Finally, by joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
country hopes to increase trade with the United States, which already ac-
counts for 60 percent of their total trade, and to expand and diversify trade 
with Europe. The major measures under the GATT agreement include:•• 
1. The basis of the current protection system is primarily on tariffs, compared with 
the previous structure that relied mainly on import licenses. About 89 percent of 
the items covered by tariffs, amounting to about 65 percent of the value of im-
ports, are now license-free. In 1982, only 20 percent of the value of imports 
escaped quantitative restrictions. 
2. Import tariffs have been cut from an interval ranging from 0 to 100 percent to one 
between 0 and 45 percent in 1986. 
3. Beginning in April 1985, there was a gradual reduction in tariff levels; by the end 
of 1988, the levels will fall to a maximum of 30 percent. 
In summary, since 1982 Mexico has progressively moved toward a 
pragmatic external approach to its massive debt problems. Debt restructur-
ing with international creditors and foreign governments, mostly the United 
States and Japan, has had top priority. In terms of internal policies, 
reforms have been undertaken in the fiscal and industrial sectors. Mexico 
has slowly moved toward supply-side economics by cutting both personal 
and corporate income taxes to stimulate increased investment and consump-
tion." 
In addition: 
1. Public spending as a proportion of GDP has been.reduced from 32·percent in 
1981 to 19 percent in 1986; real public investment from 11 to 3 percent of GDP 
over the same period. 
2. Public sector enterprises in the same period were reduced from 1, 155 to 820 with a 
further 123 companies due to be sold or closed immediately. 
3. Real wages were cut by about 45 percent for half of the 25 million workers with 
full-time jobs. 
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4. Subsidies have been cut back radically and even dangerously. For instance, Con-
asupo, the government company that produces or buys and distributes subsidized 
staple foods, has cut subsidies by a full 70 percent since 1982. In 1986 the maize 
subsidy for tortillas, the staple diet of the poor, were about one-quarter of their 
1985 levels. 
5. Imports have been liberalized with 62 percent in volume now free from import 
licenses while the country has overcome a generation of nationalist inspired trade 
isolationism and applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). 
6. The more liberal trade policy is helping to diversify the economy away from oil so 
that by mid-1986, 30.8 percent of exports were manufactured goods, up from 
17.77 percent in 1981. 
7. The government in 1984 handed back to the private sector an additional 339 com-
panies taken over by the state when the banks were nationalized in 1982. This en-
tailed privatization of most of the country's brokerage and insurance houses, 
which by now have become a dynamic alternative to the state banks and channel a 
fifth of national savings. 26 
The 1986 Rescue Package 
Mexico has been very successful in achieving its external goals. In fact 
Mexico was the first and so far only country to gain IMF approval of repay-
ment linked to its principal export, oil. In the'negotiations with the Paris 
Club, the country also achieved limited legitimacy concerning other new 
debt servicing principles. Two of the more far reaching and provocative 
principles were the priority of a minimum growth rate over strict payback 
requirements; and the potential of debtors deferring payment of interest. 
More precisely Mexico's latest major loan package (which was finally ap-
proved in March 1987) and involved as much as $7.7 billion has as its prin-
cipal provisions: 
1. A longer time schedule is allowed to repay $43. 7 billion in existing loans to Mex-
ico, extending to 20 years, with no principal due for the first seven years. 
2. Interest rates are reduced on the $43.7 billion in old loans, and on the $8.6 billion 
in loans made in 1983 and 1984, and on the $7.7 billion in new money. The in-
terest rate will be 13/16 of one percentage point above the London interbank of-
fer rate (LIBOR), the standard measurement for banks' cost of funds. 
3. Of the contingency loan fund $500 million would be available, if the Mexican 
economy grows slower than its growth targets during the first quarter of 1987 and 
$1.2 billion would be available if export receipts-principally oil-are lower than 
expected. 27 
The 1986 crisis initiated widespread debate about the causes, conse-
quences, and costs of the debt. Popular public point of view was that Mex-
ico could not and should not have to face more years of harsh austerity 
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just to satisfy the IMF and commercial bankers, but more conservative 
elements of the Mexican government felt that it was critical that Mexico 
meet the demands of the IMF and obtain the loans necessary to avoid a 
default. Others argued that the loans were necessary, but felt that conces-
sions should be made by the IMF and the international banking community. 
This · faction maintained that Mexico had attempted to restructure its 
economy and had imposed austerity. The unfortunate collapse of oil prices 
in 1986, they insisted, should be a responsibility shared by the commercial 
banks and the international financial institutions. 21 In essence, the new loan 
package provided for loans of over $12 billion for the period 1986-1987, 
and appears consistent with U.S. Treasury Secretary Baker's Third World 
debt program: 
The Baker plan ... emphasized that the debt crisis could only be resolved through 
sustained growth by the debtor countries-that austerity alone would be self-
defeating in the longer run. To achieve the requisite growth, the plan prescribed or-
thodox programs of economic reform and structural adjustment for the debtor 
countries, including greater reliance on the private sector, curtailment of state sub-
sidies and price controls, measures to stimulate both foreign and domestic invest-
ment, and export promotion and trade liberalization. The plan also called on private 
banks and international institutions to step up sharply their lending to indebted 
countries. The banks were urged to provide new commercial credits of $20 billion 
over a three year period, while the World Bank and the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank would contribute an additional $9 billion in loans. 2' 
The rescue package called for the commercial banks to generate approx-
imately $6 billion of new loans. The IMF and World Bank loans were 
contingent on the commercial bank loans being secured. This package also 
contained some concessions for Mexico. The World Bank agreed to provide 
additional credit if real economic growth was less than 3.5 percent in 1987. 
The IMF loan of $1.6 billion guaranteed additional credit if oil income fell 
below $9 billion. In exchange for this jumbo loan package, the IMF re-
quired Mexico to continue to sell off and reduce the number of state-owned 
enterprises, to liberalize trade, to attract more foreign investment, and to 
reduce its domestic deficit by three percent of GDP. 
The program has come under fairly severe criticism. Critics charge that it 
only addresses the short-run problem of servicing immediate debt obliga-
tions, and will take the pressure off the economy only if oil prices stiffen or 
even increase, that the global economy continues to grow, and that interest 
rates do not rise, all questionable assumptions. 
Furthermore, critics assert that adding another $12 billion to Mexico's 
debt will merely increase the nation's long-term debt service obligations. 
More importantly, they argue that this loan package will not reverse the 
negative transfer of capital from Mexico to the advanced nations; instead, it 
will merely perpetuate this negative flow. The critics also warn that this 
package will simply draw United States banks further into the debt 
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/quagmire. Moreover they argue that the Mexican people should not have to 
.· suffer through more years of austerity and a further decline in their already 
low standard of living. 
IMPACT OF EXTERNAL DEBT AND FISCAL 
POLICY ON THE ECONOMY 
Clearly the long-run impact of Mexico's external debt on the country's 
future growth will in large part depend on how the debt is used, and whether 
or not the debt actually results in new productive resources becoming 
available for capital formation. A particularly important question is: Has 
external debt and/or government deficits "crowded out" private sector 
investment? FitzGerald's work, 30 drawing largely on Mexican Treasury 
data, suggests that in Mexico's case government deficits tend to displace or 
crowd out private consumption. His empirical results indicate that private 
savings increased to pay for the deficit. According to FitzGerald, however, 
the increase in savings came at the expense of private consumption rather 
than private investment. Thus government deficits have had a stimulating 
effect on growth by mobilizing savings for increased levels of investment. 
The results obtained by FitzGerald led him to conclude that development 
finance in Mexico was unlike the orthodox view. 31 Under this view, savings 
is the constraint on investment. If the government finances the deficit 
through the use of savings, investment is crowded out. Savings, being the 
residual after consumption, thus determines investment. In the Mexican 
case, FitzGerald concludes that consumption and savings are residuals after 
investment and deficit levels have been met. Thus investment and the deficit 
determine the levels of consumption and savings. 32 
However, using International Monetary Fund data, Looney and 
Frederiksen33 found evidence for the more orthodox view of savings and in-
vestment in Mexico. Their findings indicated that both changes in savings 
and the level of savings were closely related to changes in GDP and the level 
of GDP respectively. Contrary to FitzGerald, they found that increases in 
savings were associated with decreases in the deficit. In addition they found 
that increases in government expenditures reduced private savings. With 
regard to the level of savings the government deficit had a minor negative 
impact. Government borrowing, as to be expected, was strongly related to 
the level of saving. 
In sum then, the picture that develops from these results is one of little direct 
crowding out. Private savings seems to be undertaken primarily to finance in-
vestment-the orthodox view of savings. While not tested directly, there is some 
evidence to suggest that increased access to credit thtough the banking system 
stimulates savings and in turn private investment. The only crowding out seems to be 
increased savings (decreased consumption) through the inflation effect of an expan-
sion in government expenditures." 
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With regard to investment, Looney and Frederiksen found a pattern 
similar to that of consumption and savings, that is, the level of investment 
appears largely determined by changes in GDP. Importantly, it does not 
seem that government financial actions significantly crowded out invest-
ment. Government credit from the banking system was positively related to 
investment as were increases in the deficit (when changes in GDP were in-
cluded in the estimating equation). 
In general government activities (both on the expenditure and financial side) do not 
appear to have crowded out investment, other than through the adverse effect of in-
flation diverting funds away from capital formation .... It appears that Mexico is 
typical of the Keynesian case, increases in the deficit were accompanied by increases 
in consumption. Apparently enough slack existed in the economy so that as deficit 
spending increases, the available resources were more fully utilized. There were 
subsequent increases in national income and consumption. The results also indicate 
that private investment is adversely affected by inflation (the latter presumably stem-
ming from government deficits." 
Looking at different time periods however, Looney and Frederiksen con-
cluded that for the later periods (1965-1981), as opposed to earlier periods 
(1951-1965), the impact of government fiscal policy was shifting from 
positive to negative: 
In general the results for the later periods suggest, contrary to FitzGerald, that the 
government deficit may over time be weakening in its impact on expanding the GDP. 
If so the impact of the deficit on investment and growth in Mexico may now be a net 
negative. The implication is that Mexico will not be able to overcome its current 
economic crisis until the government's fiscal position is under control. u 
As noted, the empirical work of FitzGerald, and Looney and Frederiksen 
were largely concerned with short-run impacts of the government's deficit 
on savings and investment. One of the more interesting results of this 
analysis was the finding by Looney and Frederiksen that several of the 
mechanisms linking the government sector to private sector activity seem to 
be breaking down; that is, the positive links that government expenditure, 
particularly its allocations to infrastructure, 37 may be breaking down, and 
in fact, turning negative. To test this hypothesis a longer term estimation 
procedure was utiHzed, that is, it can be demonstrated that an equation of 
the Koyck31 form: 
(a) y = ax + byL + z 
where (y) represents a macroeconomic aggregate such as consumption in-
vestment or gross domestic product; and (x) represents a government fiscal 
variable such as borrowing, or expenditures. The formula implies an ex-
ponential decay scheme whereby the effect of a once-and-for-all change in 
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government fiscal activity (expenditures, deficits, external borrowing, etc.) 
would affect private consumption, investment, and growth not only during 
that period, but would also have (in declining terms) an impact on their level 
in future years. It can be shown that this result stems directly from the inclu-
sion of national income lagged one year (byL) on the right hand side of the 
equation. 39 
Impact patterns along these lines are easy to imagine in Mexico's case 
where debt-supported government expenditures might be felt heavily during 
the first few time periods, decaying gradually thereafter. 
To test for a general secular decline in the effectiveness of government ex-
penditures in stimulating growth, a dummy variable was added to the 
regression equation. Much of the literature on Mexico treats each six-year 
presidential term (sexenio) as a fairly homogenous policy environment in 
which presidential economic programs•0 can be fairly easily categorized, 
that is, the stabilizing development of Diaz Ordaz, the shared development 
of. Echeverria, the high growth policies of Lopez Portillo, and the austerity 
programs of De La Madrid. 41 A dummy variable (DUMP} was created to 
capture each presidential sexenio. 0 The Diaz Ordaz years, 1966-1970 = O; 
the Echeverria years, 1971-1976 = 1; the Lopez Portillo years, 1977-1982 
= 2; and the De La Madrid years, 1983-1988 = 3. Each government fiscal 
variable (x in equation [a]) was in turn multiplied by this political dummy to 
create a variable depicting any potential change in the slope of the fiscal-
macroeconomic relationship. 0 The final equation used for estimation was 
therefore: 
(b) y = ax + byL + dx + z 
where dx = the dummy (DUMP) times the fiscal variable, (x). Statical 
significance of this variable would indicate a secular (by sexenio) change in 
the manner in which government fiscal activities impact on the economy. 
The fiscal variables examined in the regression equations were: 
GEP = Government expenditures (line 82, IFS); 
BDP = Net government domestic borrowing (line 84a, IFS); 
BFP = Net government foreign borrowing (line 85a, IFS). 
DGEP, DBDP, and DBFP represent these fiscal variables multiplied by the 
political sexenio dummy, DUMP. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Estimates of the distributed lag impact of fiscal developments debt on 
various macroeconomic aggregates over the 1966-84 period produced the 
following results. 
Private Consumption (PCNP}: 
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(l)PCNP 1.05 PCNPL + 0.29 GEP - 0.17 DGEF - 0.02RHO 
(24.36) (1.19) (-2.74) (-0.08) 
r• = 0.975; DW = 1.85 
(2)PCNP 1.05PCNPL + 1.35BDP - 0.19DBDP - 0.20RHO 
(54.27) (2.19) (-3.20) (-0.83) 
r• = 0.979; DW = 1.94 
(3)PCNP 1.07 PCNPL + 0.99BFP - 1.28DBFP - 0.45RHO 
(125.28) (1.11) (-4.5) (-2.131) 
r 2 = 0.995;DW = 2.16 
Gross Capital Formation (TINP): 
(4) TINP 1.17 TINPL + 0.02GEP - 0.09DGEP + 0.09RHO 
(4.71) (0.05) (-1.14) (0.37) 
r2 = 0.832; DW = 1.72 
(5) TINP 1.12 TINPL + 0.60BDP - 0.52DBDP - 0.04RHO 
(14.91) (0.89) (-1.90) (-0.18) 
r 2 = 0.874; DW = 1.87 
(6) TINP 1.16 TINPL - 0.30BFP - 0.83DBFP - 0.43RHO 
(31.32) (-0.25) (-2.03) (-2.00) 
r 2 = 0.963; DW = 2.19 
(7) TINP -0.14 TINPL + 0.89PCNP - O.otDPCNP - 0.13RHO 
(-1.04) (6.48) (-0.60) (-0.171) 
r• = 0.819; DW = 2.00 
Gross Domestic Product (GDPNP): 
(8)GDPNP = 1.10GDPNPL - 0.o7 GEP - 0.13DGEP + 0.31RHO 
(26.01) (-0.22) (-1.54) (1.34) 
r 2 = 0.971; DW = 1.62 
(9)GDPNP 1.01GDPNPL + 1.11 BDP - 0.80DBDP + 0.15RHO 
(60.18) (1.36) (-2.14) (0.63) 
r 2 = 0.978; DW = 1.76 
(lO)GDPNP = 1.0SGDPNPL - 0.38BFP - 1.llDBFP - 0.24RHO 
(113.51) (-0.26) (-2.10) (-1.04) 
r 2 = 0.995; DW = 2.08 
(ll)GDPNP 0.12GDPNPL + 1.20TINP + 0.04DTINP + 0.21RHO 
(2.29) (17.23) (1.25) (0.98) 
r 2 = 0.970; DW = 1.43 
• (12)GDPNP 0.26GDPNL + 1.12PCNP + 0.05DPCNP + 0.43RHO 
(1.97) (6.25) (2.17) (1.98) 
r 2 = 0.981; DW = 1.50 
In general the results indicate:'' 
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1. Given the low t-values on the bx term, government expenditures or borrowing 
have had, at best, only a marginally positive impact on private consumption over 
the period examined. In addition there has been a decreasing effectiveness in the 
ability of the government to increase private sector consumption with the negative 
sign on the dummy term, indicating that private consumption as a proportion of 
government fiscal activity is decreasing considerably with each successive 
presidential sexenio. In terms of the strength of fiscal policy, private-sector con-
sumption has been most adversely affected over time by external borrowing, 
followed by domestic borrowing, with government expenditures having the least 
negative impact. 
~. Gross capital formation has not been stimulated by government expenditure or 
borrowing. If anything, the negative slopes on the dummy terms indicate that 
government fiscal actions are increasingly crowding out productive investment. 
On the other hand, private-sector consumption appears to be a major factor 
stimulating increased levels of investment. In contrast to fiscal policies, private 
consumption has not experienced diminishing returns over time in affecting in-
vestment. 
3. Gross domestic product has also not been positively affected by government ex-
penditures or borrowing. As with investment, whatever impact government ac-
tions have had on GDP appear to be encountering decreasing effectiveness; that 
is, GDP as a percentage of government expenditures or borrowing has been 
decreasing with each successive presidential sexenio." On the other hand both in-
vestment and consumption have had a strong positive impact on GDP, with no 
signs of diminishing returns. 
To sum, it appears that whatever positive impacts government expen-
diture and borrowing may have historically had on the economy, these 
effects are no longer present. In fact there is evidence that Mexico is increas-
ingly facing diminishing returns in terms of the government's ability to in-
ject a net positive stimulus to the economy. Apparently any near term 
revitalization of the economy will have to be derived from an autonomous 
expansion of private rather than public-sector expenditures. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical results above suggest several principles that should serve as 
the basis of resolving the Mexican government's current short-term dilem-
ma of the best use to be made of the country's large reserve position, 
together with the longer term problem facing both the United States and 
Mexico as to the resolution of the country's external debt situation. 
In terms of the short-run problem, it is apparent that when Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari assumes Office in late 1988 he must tackle the fundamental prob-
lem that has confounded the present administration as well as its 
predecessors: how to regain the high rates of growth that characterized the 
Mexican economy over the 1955-1970 period. Since the early 1970s suc-
cessive governments have attempted to solve this dilemma by either export-
ing oil, or increasing the country's external debt. Although there has been 
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some progress in transforming the structure of the Mexican economy, there 
is little reason to believe that simply increasing government expenditures 
will return the country to a self-sustaining high growth path. As Castaneda 
notes, whatever policies he chooses, Salinas de Gortari will need all the 
foreign reserves and breathing room he can get. Saving the nation's reserves 
for his successor could be President De La Madrid's wisest move. 
In terms of longer run policies for dealing with the varied issues 
surrounding the country's external debt, the options appear to be (a) 
default, (b) a further variant of the current Baker-type stabilization pro-
gram agreed to in March 1987, or (c) a combination of (a) and (b). 46 The 
default option can probably be rejected out of hand for political reasons, 
although it is not apparent that from a purely economic viewpoint there 
would be any great costs to Mexico. •1 The first offspring of the Baker Plan 
was the "growth oriented" adjustment plan for Mexico put into effect in 
March 1977. Another version of this approach to external debt is the 
Bradley Plan. As in the Baker Plan, Mexico would be required to liberalize 
its international trading arrangements and generally adopt market-oriented 
reforms. Clearly any approach to alleviating the debt problem that is likely 
to revive economic growth in Mexico (and other indebted countries) is 
welcomed. Yet the Baker and Bradley type proposals raise some disturbing 
questions both as to their feasibility and their desirability. 41 
Countries get into debt servicing problems for two kinds of reasons: bad luck and 
bad management or bad policies. (Among the latter we include those that get into 
trouble by design.) Bad luck includes such external (to borrowing countries) shocks 
as the rise in world wide real interest rates (largely made in the USA), adverse shifts 
in the terms of trade (the decline in the oil price in the case of Mexico) .... The pro-
posals are unfair in that they do not make the magnitude or the terms on which the 
relief is provided contingent on whether the country's problems are due to bad luck 
or bad management. Past policy performance is not taken into account. Future 
policy reform and performance is of course put at the center of the stage, but it is 
doubtful whether this can be taken too seriously, precisely because past policies (or 
how a country got into the current mess) are not taken into account. By treating the 
existing debt as a bygone and focusing exclusively on (promises of) future policies for 
trade liberalization, privatization, fiscal probity etc., these proposals contribute to 
an environment in which countries are more likely deliberately to build up their debt 
once more to unsustainable levels in the expectation of a Bradley Plan Vintage II 
when the next crisis hits. 0 
The empirical analysis above, while acknowledging that Mexico has had its 
share of bad luck, ' 0 also identifies a long-run secular decline in the eff ec-
tiveness of government expenditures as a major cause of the country's current 
debt problems. Until this limitation to growth is overcome, it is unlikely that 
the current stabilization effort or future Baker-Bradley type programs will be 
of any real value in solving the country's growth difficulties. 
If solutions (a) and (b) to the debt problem are not viable, what is left? 
Pragmatic Mexicans realized some time ago that a number of political and 
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economic reforms need to be enacted before the country will be able to 
return to any type of growth path resembling that achieved in the 1955-1970 
period." Controls on capital flight, privatization of inefficient and corrupt 
state-controlled industries, a lowering of trade barriers, and tax reform and 
price controls have been instituted or are being considered. 52 It will be 
politically impossible to fully implement these reforms without a significant 
reduction and eventual elimination of the debt burden. A long-term debt 
moratorium (like a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in the United States) 
would guarantee Mexico a new start and some hope of success. 53 In return, 
however, Mexico would be required to exchange at a rate of 50 cents on the 
dollar, an increasing volume each year of debt for equity, and in fact en-
courage the expansion of such programs., 
The empirical analysis· above indicated that any long-term solution to 
Mexico's growth-debt problems must involve a gradual contraction of the 
public sector in the economy and an expansion of private sector activity. 
Using this general principal, several guidelines for a.long-term solution to 
the country's economic problems are apparent: 
1. Reforms must be adequate in scope to end the negative capital flow from Mexico 
to the advanced industrial nations. Clearly this will involve tax and other 
measures to increase the private rate of return on investments in Mexico. 
2. Any new money loaned to Mexico must be used for productive investment that 
increases capital formation and the competitive productive capability of the na-
tion. To increase the attractiveness of these loans, the United States government 
should provide the guarantee. 
3. To reduce the increasing burden posed by public sector deficits, the government 
will have to make a more determined effort to raise domestic revenues, both 
through tax reform and increased tax collection. 54 
If implemented, these policies should enable the country to achieve a long-
run solution to its debt problems, while at the same time assuring a sus-
tainable flow of external capital. 
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